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Abstract
This paper introduces and analyzes the class of multi-utilitarian solutions for
cooperative bargaining problems. We show that generalized Gini solutions and
inequality averse Choquet bargaining solutions are particular cases of this new
multi-valued solution concept and provide a complete characterization of inequality
averse multi-utilitarian solutions in which an invariance property consisting of a
weakening of both the linear invariance axiom in Blackorby et al. (1994) and
the restricted invariance axiom in Ok and Zhou (2000). Moreover, by relaxing
the assumptions involved in the characterization, the class is extended to include
equality averse multi-utilitarian solutions which are also studied in the paper.
Keywords: Axiomatic bargaining theory, multi-valued bargaining solutions, gener-
alized Gini solutions, inequality averse Choquet solutions.
1 Introduction
A cooperative bargaining problem consists of a set of agents and a feasible set of utility
payo®s. This paper deals with bargaining solutions. In cooperative bargaining theory
it is commonly assumed that solutions are single-valued. However, in this paper more
general solutions are permitted, they are assumed to be multi-valued, that is, choice
correspondences that assign a connected subset of the feasible utility payo®s to each
problem. Most solutions proposed in the literature share a common principle of ratio-
nality: they are consistent with the maximization of some ordering of the utility space.
Following this principle, Blackorby et al. (1994) introduced and characterized gener-
alized Gini bargaining solutions, which are rationalized by generalized Gini orderings
of the utility vectors. These orderings can be represented by quasi-concave, increasing
social welfare functions that are linear in some particular cones of IRn
+.
Ok and Zhou (2000) provided a characterization of a wider family of bargaining
solutions, known as Choquet bargaining solutions. In their approach, the authors
substituted the Linear Invariance axiom of Blackorby et al. (1994) with a weaker one:
Restricted Invariance. These Choquet solutions correspond to orderings that can be
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represented by social welfare functions derived from Choquet integrals with respect to
a monotonic capacity (see Schmeidler, 1986). These functions are increasing and linear
in every rank-ordered subset of IRn
+, but not necessarily quasi-concave nor anonymous
as in the generalized Gini solutions.
In the present paper we go a step further by introducing and characterizing a related
class of bargaining solutions, the class of multi-utilitarian solutions. The solutions in
this class are also rationalized by piecewise linear increasing social welfare functions
de¯ned on the agents' utility gains. They depend on a set of weighted utilitarian
criteria and on the decision rule used to combine them.
If a conservative principle is to be applied to combine the di®erent utilitarian crite-
ria, then each outcome will be measured by the one that provides the minimum value.
The bargaining solutions induced in this case are inequality averse and their analysis
is the main goal of this paper.
Every inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solution has an associated fam-
ily of cones that covers IRn
+ and is rationalized by an increasing social welfare function
which is linear in every cone of the family. Since they can be represented as the min-
imum of a set of linear functions, the outcomes induced by these solutions can be
computed by solving maximin optimization problems that have a linear formulation if
the set of feasible utilities is a polyhedric set.
Our characterization is based on a weakening of the Restricted Invariance axiom,
which we call Coregional Invariance. This new axiom states that if a problem is trans-
lated, and the Pareto frontier remains in the same cone or \region", then the solution
is also translated.
As a consequence of our de¯nition of inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargain-
ing solutions, an alternative representation of both generalized Gini solutions and of
inequality averse Choquet bargaining solutions is provided. We prove that they are par-
ticular cases of inequality averse multi-utilitarian solutions and therefore are induced
by social welfare functions which can be described as the minimum of certain linear
functions.
Furthermore, we consider the case where the feasible outcomes are measured by the
criterion providing the highest value, and de¯ne a related class of solutions that are also
induced by piecewise linear functions, equality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solu-
tions. For two-person bargaining problems, a joint characterization of these solutions
and of inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solutions is obtained when erasing
a condition of compromisability from the set of axioms that characterizes inequality
averse multi-utilitarian solutions. It is also shown that this result does not hold for
bargaining problems with more than two agents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 previous concepts are
presented and the notation is established. In Section 3 we introduce inequality averse
multi-utilitarian solutions, study the connections with other bargaining solutions al-
ready existing in the literature and provide the axiomatization of these new solutions.
Section 4 contains the analysis of equality averse multi-utilitarian solutions. Section








2 Previous concepts and notation
Let IR (IR+, IR++) denote the set of all (non-negative, positive) real numbers and let
IRn (IRn
+, IRn
++) be the n-fold Cartesian product of IR (IR+, IR++). The origin of IRn
is 0n and 1n is n-dimensional vector consisting of n ones. The set of all non-negative
integers is denoted by IN and jHj represents the cardinality of the subset H in IN. We
use conventional notation for comparison of vectors: x ¸ y means that xi ¸ yi for all
i = 1;2;:::n, x > y indicates that x ¸ y and x 6= y and x À y means xi > yi for all
i = 1;2;:::;n.
Let co(A) denote the convex hull of the set A in IRn, cch(A) denote the convex and
comprehensive hull of A and int(A) denote the relative interior of A.
By x¢y we denote the scalar product of the vectors x; y 2 IRn, that is, x¢y =
Pn
i=1 xiyi.
Let ¢n denote the n-dimensional simplex, ¢n =
©
¸ 2 IRn
+ j ¸¢1n = 1
ª
. A polyhedric
subset ¤ µ ¢n is the intersection of ¢n and a ¯nite set of half-spaces in IRn, Let
ext(¤) denote the set of its extreme points, that is, ext(¤) = f¸ 2 ¤j = 9 ¸1; ¸2 2
¤; ® 2 (0;1) such that ¸ = ®¸1 + (1 ¡ ®)¸2g.
N = f1;2;:::;ng is a set of n agents and 2N is the set of all possible subsets of N.
Let ¼ : N ! N denote a permutation function, in which ¼(i) = j means that the i-th
component of the n-dimensional permuted vector is j. Let x¼ be the ¼-permutation
of vector x 2 IRn, x¼ = (x¼(1);x¼(2);:::;x¼(n)). The set of all possible permutation
functions is denoted by ¦.
An n-person bargaining problem can be described by a set of feasible utility vectors,
S µ IRn, where we assume that S is convex, compact, and comprehensive (relative
to IRn
+), that is, when x 2 S, then y 2 S for all 0 · y · x, and that there exists
x 2 S \ IRn
++. The set of n-person bargaining problems is denoted by §.
A bargaining solution is a correspondence F : § ! IRn
+ such that F(S) µ S for all
S 2 §. Notice that F is allowed to yield multiple outcomes to a bargaining problem.
Some classic solutions for cooperative bargaining which are of interest in this paper,
are the egalitarian solution and the weighted utilitarian solutions.
The egalitarian solution, E, (Kalai (1977)) is for each S 2 §, E(S) = fx 2 S jxi =
xj for all i;j = 1;2;:::;n; and there is no y 2 S such that y À xg.
The weighted utilitarian solution, U¸, (Myerson (1977)) is for each S 2 §, U¸(S) =




i=1 ¸iyi for all y 2 Sg with ¸ 2 IRn
++. A particular case is the
utilitarian solution, U, obtained for ¸ = 1n.
The solutions addressed in this paper extend the class of utilitarian solutions to the
case where several weighted utilitarian criteria are taken into account at the same time.
3 Inequality averse multi-utilitarian solutions
A social welfare function is said to be inequality averse if it is quasi-concave on IRn
+. We
now introduce a class of solutions induced by concave social welfare functions which we







a mix of the egalitarian principle and the utilitarian principle, so that they are inequality
averse but include weighted utilitarian criteria to achieve compromise results.
In a situation where several weighted utilitarian criteria have to be taken into ac-
count, a way of ¯nding a compromise between egalitarism and weighted utilitarism is
the adoption of a conservative position by measuring the outcomes by a concave social
welfare function described by the minimum of the di®erent utilitarian functions.
De¯nition 3.1. Given the polyhedron ¤ µ int(¢n), with extreme points ¸i; i =










For a vector x 2 IRn
+, as a consequence of the linearity of the scalar product, if
m¤(x) attains its minimum at ^ ¸ 2 ext(¤), then the real number m¤(x) = ^ ¸ ¢ x repre-
sents the minimum level attainable by all the functions f(x) = ¸ ¢x, ¸ 2 ¤, across the
axis determined by 1n. In this sense, the inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargain-
ing solution F¤ can be interpreted as a compromise solution between the egalitarian
solution and the ¸-utilitarian solutions for ¸ 2 ¤.
As a particular case, when ¤ is a singleton then F¤ is the corresponding weighted
utilitarian solution. Note also that the limit case, where ¤ = ¢n, yields the egalitarian
solution.
Example 3.2. Figure 1 illustrates the results provided by the solution F¤ for two dif-
ferent bargaining problems. In Case I the result coincides with that obtained with the
weighted utilitarian solution, U¸, for a vector of weights ¸ 2 ¤. The result in Case II





















Figure 1: Inequality averse multi-utilitarian solution.
A setting where inequality averse multi-utilitarian solutions could be of interest
for the analysis of cooperative bargaining problems is the following: There are sev-
eral arbitrators or social planners working to help the players to cooperate, each using
a di®erent weighted utilitarian criteria to measure the feasible outcomes. The corre-







minimum level between the criteria of all the arbitrators and also between all possible
convex combinations of these criteria, is maximized.
The outcomes provided by an inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solution
can be computed by solving the optimization problem (3.1):
max t







When S 2 § is a polyhedric set, then (3.1) is a linear programming program.
Associated to each inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solution there is a





+ such that m¤(x) = ^ ¸¢x
o
:
In each of these cones the function m¤ performs as a linear increasing function, and
therefore, inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solutions are rationalized by a
monotone function which is piecewise linear.
In the next result, some properties of the families of cones induced by these solutions
are established.
Proposition 3.3. Given the polyhedron ¤ µ int(¢n), the family of cones fC¤(^ ¸)g^ ¸2ext(¤)
veri¯es the following properties:
1. For each ^ ¸ 2 ext(¤), C¤(^ ¸) is the intersection of a ¯nite set of half-spaces deter-
mined by hyperplanes containing the set ft1n; t 2 IR+g.










4. If ^ ¸1; ^ ¸2 2 ext(¤), ^ ¸1 6= ^ ¸2, then int
³
C¤(^ ¸1) \ C¤(^ ¸2)
´
= ;.
Note that di®erent polyhedrons may generate the same family of cones. For instance
all the polyhedrons generated by the permutations of a positive vector generate the
rank ordered division of IRn
+. Consider the equivalence relation R de¯ned in the set
of polyhedrons included in ¢n as ¤R¤0 if the family of cones generated by m¤ is the
same as the family of cones generated by m¤0. This equivalence relation induces classes
of equivalence in the set of polyhedrons contained in IRn
+.
For two-person bargaining problems, inequality averse multi-utilitarian solutions
can only induce two di®erent families of cones or regions in IR2
+. If ¤ is a singleton,
there is a unique cone that consists of the whole set IR2







¸1; ¸2, then the division fC¤(^ ¸1);C¤(^ ¸2)g does not depend on ¤. In this case C¤(^ ¸1) =
fx 2 IR2
+ jx1¡x2 ¸ 0g, and C¤(^ ¸2) = fx 2 IR2
+ jx1¡x2 · 0g. Therefore, for two-person
bargaining problems, two equivalence classes exist f­1;­2g, where ­1 = f¤ µ ¢n with
a unique extreme pointg and ­2 = f¤ µ ¢n with two extreme pointsg. Nevertheless,
for n ¸ 3, the number of cones in the family fC¤(^ ¸)g^ ¸2ext(¤) coincides with the number
of extreme points of the polyhedron ¤.
Example 3.4. For a three-person bargaining problem, consider ¤ ½ int(¤3) with ex-
treme points ¸1 = (3=5;1=5;1=5), ¸2 = (1=10;4=5;1=10), ¸3 = (1=5;1=5;3=5). Figure
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Figure 2: Family of cones associated with F¤.
Proposition 3.3 allows us to de¯ne the concept of coregionalism for each class of
equivalence induced by the equivalence relation R in the set of polyhedrons included
in ¢n. Let ­ be a class of equivalence.
De¯nition 3.5. x; y 2 IRn
+ are ­-coregional if for any ¤ 2 ­, m¤(x) = ¸¤x and
m¤(y) = ¸¤y for a ¯xed ¸¤ 2 ext(¤). The subsets T1; T2 ½ IRn
+ are ­-coregional if x
and y are ­-coregional for all x 2 T1 and y 2 T2.
Note that the property of comonotonicity de¯ned in Ok and Zhou (2000) is a par-
ticular case of coregionalism when the corresponding equivalence class is formed by
the polyhedrons generated by all the permutations of a positive n-dimensional vector
(as we will show in the following subsection, other polyhedrons exist that generate the
same rank ordered division of IRn
+).
3.1 Connections with other Bargaining Solutions
We now analyze the relationship between the class of inequality averse multi-utilitarian
bargaining solutions and two interesting classes of solutions which already exist in the
literature: generalized Gini bargaining solutions and Choquet bargaining solutions.
Generalized Gini bargaining solutions were introduced by Blackorby et al. (1994).







For a 2 IRn






where (x(1);x(2);:::;x(n)) denotes a rank-ordered permutation of x 2 IRn, that is,
x(1) · x(2) · ::: · x(n).




The following example in IR2 illustrates this solution concept.
Example 3.6. Figure 3 represents the compromise outcome provided by the generalized
Gini bargaining solution for ga(x) = 2=3x(1) + 1=3x(2), together with the outcomes










Figure 3: Egalitarian, utilitarian and generalized Gini solution.
Notice that the generalized Gini ordering ga(x) can be alternatively written as
ga(x) = minf2=3x1 + 1=3x2; 1=3x1 + 2=3x2g. This expression coincides with m¤ for
the inequality averse multi-utilitarian solution F¤, where ¤ = co(^ ¸1; ^ ¸2) ½ ¤2, whose
extreme points are ^ ¸1 = (2=3; 1=3) and ^ ¸2 = (1=3; 2=3).
This result is general as stated in Theorem 3.7, where we prove that generalized Gini
solutions are particular cases of inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solutions.
They are induced by the polyhedrons generated by the permutations of vectors with
positive components.
Consider a = (a1;a2;:::;an) 2 ¢n, a1 ¸ a2 ¸ ::: ¸ an > 0. Denote by ¤a the
polyhedron generated by the permutations of the vector a, ¤a = co(fa¼;¼ 2 ¦g),
and let ®1;®2;:::;®k be its extreme points. Note that, in general, k · n!, and the
inequality is strict when some components of a coincide.
Theorem 3.7. The generalized Gini solution Ga is, for each S 2 §,









It follows that the class of generalized Gini solutions is the subclass of inequality
averse multi-utilitarian solutions obtained by considering the polyhedron generated by
the set of permutations of positive vectors.
Notice that if a1 = a2 = ::: = an, then ¤a = fag and the corresponding gener-
alized Gini solution is the utilitarian solution, Ga = F¤a = U. Furthermore, when
a1 approaches 1 and the remaining components a2; a3; :::; an tend to 0, then ¤a ap-
proaches the n-dimensional simplex, ¢n, and Ga provides an outcome close to the
egalitarian result.
A wider class of bargaining solutions related to inequality averse multi-utilitarian
solutions is the class of Choquet bargaining solutions, introduced by Ok and Zhou
(2000).
Let v be a monotonic (v(K) < v(L) for all K ½ L) real-valued set function on 2N with
v(;) = 0, called a capacity on N (we suppose that v is 1-normalized, that is, v(N) = 1).




[v (f(i);(i + 1);:::;(n)g) ¡ v(f(i + 1);:::;(n)g)]x(i);
where (x(1);x(2);:::;x(n)) denotes the rank-ordered permutation of x 2 IRn such that
x(1) · x(2) · ::: · x(n) and, by convention, f(n + 1);(n)g ´ ;.




It is worth noting that the normative properties of a Choquet solution, Cv, are
completely embodied in v. Hence, by focusing on certain subclasses of monotonic
capacities, some particularly interesting subclasses of Choquet bargaining solutions are
obtained.
Inequality averse Choquet bargaining solutions are obtained from quasi-concave
Choquet social welfare functions, which are associated to convex capacities, that is,
capacities with the property that v(K [ fig) ¡ v(K) · v(L [ fig) ¡ v(L), for all
K ½ L µ N and i = 2 L.
Note that if the marginal contribution of any agent to any coalition is a positive
constant, that is to say, v(T) ¡ v(S) = t 2 IR++ for all T; S µ N, jTj = jSj + 1, then
the Choquet bargaining solution is the utilitarian, Cv = U.
An anonymous Choquet social welfare function (Wv(x) = Wv(x¼) for all ¼ 2 ¦) can
be obtained by considering symmetric capacities (v(K) = vk for all K µ N with jKj =
k) and the resulting Choquet solution is then called a symmetric Choquet bargaining
solution.
Ok and Zhou (2000) showed that for monotonic, symmetric, and convex capacities,
the corresponding Choquet solution is the generalized Gini solution and therefore, the
concept of inequality averse Choquet bargaining solution is the extension of the gener-








Our next result, Theorem 3.9, shows that an alternative way of writing inequality
averse Choquet bargaining solutions is obtained as a consequence of the convexity of
the capacities. In this representation it is easy to see that inequality averse Choquet
bargaining solutions are particular cases of inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining
solutions. To prove the result we rely on the following well-known characterization of
convexity of capacities (see, for instance Curiel (1997)). Let c¼
i (v) denote the marginal
contribution of agent i to the coalition of his ¼-predecessors, P(¼;i) = fj 2 N j¼¡1(j) <
¼¡1(i)g, that is, c¼
i (v) = v(P(¼;i) [ fig) ¡ v(P(¼;i)).
Lemma 3.8. v is a convex capacity if and only if min¼2¦
P
i2T c¼
i (v) = v(T), for all
T µ N.
For x 2 IRn
+, let ¼x 2 ¦ denote a permutation that arranges the components of
vector x 2 IRn
+ in decreasing order, that is, if x¼(i) ¸ x¼(i+1), for all i = 1;:::;n¡1. It
is easy to verify that the social welfare function, Wv, can be rewritten in terms of the









Notice that the coe±cient of xi in Wv(x) represents the marginal contribution of
agent i to the coalition P(¼x;i) with respect to the capacity v. This coalition is included
in the set of agents that obtains an outcome greater than or equal to that obtained by
agent i in the allocation x 2 S.
Consider the vectors c¼ whose components are the marginal contributions of each
agent to the coalition of their predecessors according to each permutation ¼ 2 ¦.
Consider also the Weber set (Weber, 1988) associated with v, that is, the polyhedron,
¤¦
v µ int(¢n), generated by c¼, ¼ 2 ¦. Theorem 3.9 establishes that inequality
averse Choquet bargaining solutions are inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining
solutions with respect to the Weber set associated with v.
Theorem 3.9. If v is a monotonic and convex capacity on N, then the inequality
averse Choquet bargaining solution Cv(S) is for all S 2 §,
Cv(S) = F¤¦





This section aims to examine the axiomatic basis of the class of inequality averse multi-
utilitarian bargaining solutions. The axioms involved in the characterization are stated
below.
For each S 2 §, we denote by PO(S) the set of all strongly Pareto optimal points
of S, PO(S) = fx 2 S j there exists no y 2 S; y > xg.
Strong Pareto Optimality (SPO): For all S 2 §, F(S) µ PO(S).
Arrow's Choice Axiom (ACA) (Arrow (1959)): For all S; T 2 §, if T µ S and







Arrow's Choice Axiom requires that choices be consistent with respect to contraction of
the choice set. This axiom reduces to the property of Nash's independence of irrelevant
alternatives (Nash (1950)) in the case of single-valued bargaining solutions.
Continuity Axiom (CON): For any S 2 § and x 2 S, if there exists a sequence
Sm such that (i) jF(Sm)j = 1 for all m; (ii) Sm ! S (in Hausdor® topology); (iii)
F(Sm) ! fxg, then x 2 F(S).
An invariance property will play a central role in characterizing inequality averse
multi-utilitarian bargaining solutions.
Coregional Invariance Axiom (Co-INV): There exists a class of equivalence, ­,
such that, for all S 2 §, x 2 F(S) and y 2 IRn, with cch(S + y) 2 §, if PO(S) and
PO(S + y) are ­-coregional, then x + y 2 F(cch(S + y)).
A ¯nal axiom is established to impose a \fairness" requirement that can be inter-
preted as a kind of connectedness.
Compromisability Axiom (COM): For any S 2 §, jF(S)j 6= 2.
Compromisability was introduced by Ok and Zhou (2000) and is a weakening of the
Connectedness axiom of Blackorby et al. (1994).
The main result of this section is the following characterization of inequality averse
multi-utilitarian solutions.
Theorem 3.10. A bargaining solution, F, satis¯es SPO, ACA, CON, Co-INV and
COM if and only if there exists ¤ 2 int(¢n) such that F = F¤.
Note that, if the following axiom of Anonymity is added to those axioms that
characterize inequality averse multi-utilitarian solutions, then the class of generalized
Gini solutions is obtained.
Anonymity Axiom (A): For all S 2 § and x 2 F(S), x¼ 2 F(fy¼ jy 2 Sg) for any
¼ 2 ¦.
4 Equality averse multi-utilitarian solutions
When the condition of compromisability is erased from the set of axioms in Theorem
3.10, a wider class of bargaining solutions emerges. These solutions are still induced
by piecewise linear functions, but not necessarily concave. We will now focus on the
subclass of those solutions rationalized by convex social welfare functions. They are
also based on weighted utilitarian criteria, but in this case they are not inequality averse
and they yield results biased towards extreme utilitarian payo®s. We will call them
equality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solutions.
De¯nition 4.1. Given the polyhedron ¤ µ int(¢n), with extreme points ¸i; i =
1;2;:::;k, the equality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solution, ¹ F¤, is for each S 2
§,

















Figure 5 illustrates the result obtained from an equality averse multi-utilitarian









Figure 5: Equality averse multi-utilitarian solution.
The outcomes provided by these solutions can be computed by solving k optimiza-
tion problems. For j = 1;:::;k, denote the optimal value of the j-th problem as t¤
j:
t¤
j = max ¸j¢x




jg, then the outcomes provided by the equality averse multi-
utilitarian bargaining solution, ¹ F¤(S), are the set of optimal solutions of the r-th prob-
lem.
The following result establishes that for two-person bargaining problems (n = 2)
the axioms SPO, ACA, CON, and Co-INV jointly characterize both inequality averse
multi-utilitarian bargaining solutions and equality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining
solutions.
Theorem 4.2. For two-person bargaining problems, a bargaining solution, F, satis¯es
SPO, ACA, CON and Co-INV if and only if there exists ¤ 2 int(¢n) such that either,
F = F¤ or F = ¹ F¤.
It is worth pointing out that for n ¸ 3, there exist piecewise linear increasing func-
tions (generated by extreme points of polyhedrons ¤ ½ ¢n) that are neither concave
nor convex, and therefore the bargaining solutions induced are neither inequality averse
multi-utilitarian bargaining solutions nor equality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining
solutions, as is shown in the following example.



















Figure 6: The vectors ¸i, i = 1;2;3;4 that generate the polyhedron ¤.
Consider also a piecewise linear increasing function W : IR3 ! IR de¯ned in each
cone as follows:
ext(¤) Linear function Cone or region
¸1 = (4=11;1=3;10=33) W1(x) = 4=11x + 1=3y + 10=33z C¤(¸1) = fx; jy · z; x ¸ yg
¸2 = (4=11;10=33;1=3) W2(x) = 4=11x + 10=33y + 1=3z C¤(¸1) = fx; jy ¸ z; x ¸ yg
¸3 = (1=3;4=11;10=33) W3(x) = 1=3x + 4=11y + 10=33z C¤(¸1) = fx; jy · z; x · yg
¸4 = (1=3;1=3;1=3) W4(x) = 1=3x + 1=3y + 1=3z C¤(¸1) = fx; jy ¸ z; x · yg
Figure 7 represents the level 1 curve of W. Since W(3=2;3=2;0) = 1 = W(3=2;0;3=2)
and W(3=2;3=4;3=4) = 45=44 > 1, W is not convex. Since W(3=2;0;3=2) = 1 =
W(0;3=2;3=2) and W(3=4;3=4;3=2) = 43=44 < 1, W is not concave. Therefore
argmax
x2S
W(x) provides solutions that are neither inequality averse multi-utilitarian
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Figure 7: Curve of level 1 of W(x).
Inequality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining solutions and equality averse multi-
utilitarian bargaining solutions are rationalized by m¤ and M¤ respectively. Both
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Figure 8: Family of cones, fC¤(¸i)gi=1;2;3;4, induced by m¤ and M¤.
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Figure 9: Level 1 curves for m¤ and M¤.
5 Concluding remarks
Inequality averse multi-utilitarian and equality averse multi-utilitarian bargaining so-
lutions constitute two classes of solutions whose intersection is the class of weighted
utilitarian solutions. They both intersect the family of Choquet bargaining solutions.
The class of inequality averse multi-utilitarian solutions contains that of inequality
averse Choquet bargaining solutions and therefore also the class of generalized Gini








Inequality averse Multi-Utilitarian solutions
Inequality averse Choquet solutions
Generalized Gini  solutions Equality  averse Multi-Utilitarian solutions
Utilitarian solutions
Figure 10: Inclusions.
Note that both inequality and equality averse multi-utilitarian solutions, together
with Choquet bargaining solutions are all obtained from generalized Gini solutions when
the Anonymity axiom is erased. Nevertheless, the class of solutions that arises from the
elimination of Anonymity is wider if the invariance axiom is adapted to accommodate
more general polyhedrons. If polyhedrons included in ¢n
p = f¸ 2 IRn
+ j¸¢p = 1g with
p À 0n are considered instead of being included in the simplex ¢n, then two more
general classes of solutions verifying SPO, ACA, CON and Co-INV emerge, that could
be called p-inequality averse multi-utilitarian and p-equality averse multi-utilitarian
solutions.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.3: Since the proof of 3 is straightforward, we prove 1,2 and
4:
1. C¤(^ ¸) = fx 2 IRn
+ j ^ ¸¢x · ¸¢x; 8¸ 2 ext(¤); ¸ 6= ^ ¸g = fx 2 IRn
+ j(^ ¸ ¡ ¸)¢
x · 0; 8¸ 2 ext(¤); ¸ 6= ^ ¸g and the set ft1n; t 2 IR+g is included in every
hyperplane (^ ¸ ¡ ¸)¢x = 0 since ¸¢1n = 1 for all ¸ 2 ext(¤).
2. If ^ ¸ is a extreme point of the polyhedron ¤, it is possible to ¯nd a supporting
hyperplane of ¤ at ^ ¸, c¢x = a, with a 2 IR, c 2 IRn, such that c¢^ ¸ = a and c¢¸ < a
for all ¸ 2 ext(¤), ¸ 6= ^ ¸. Let b = ®c+(1¡®)1n, with a su±ciently small ® such





4. Consider x 2 int
³
C¤(^ ¸1) \ C¤(^ ¸2)
´









, ^ ¸1¢x < ^ ¸2¢x and ^ ¸1¢x > ^ ¸2¢x, respectively.
This is a contradiction. 2




i=1 a¼(i)x(i) for any
¼ 2 ¦. Consider an elemental permutation, ¼k, 1 · k < n, that consists of ¼k(k) =










i6=k;k+1 aix(i) + ak+1x(k) + akx(k+1) =
Pn
i=1 aix(i) + (ak ¡ ak+1)(x(k+1) ¡ x(k)) ¸ Pn
i=1 aix(i), since ak ¸ ak+1 and x(k) · x(k+1).
Now, for any ¼ 2 ¦, let ¼n+1 be the identity permutation and recursively de¯ne
¼k, k = n; n ¡ 1; :::; 3; 2, as follows: ¼k is the identity permutation if ¼(k) =
¼k+1¼k+2 :::¼n+1(k), and otherwise, ( that is, ¼(k) = ¼k+1¼k+2 :::¼n+1(h)) for some
h 2 f1; 2; :::; k¡1g, then ¼k is the composition of permutations, ¼k = ¼k¡1¼k¡2 :::¼h+1¼h.





i=1 a¼(i)xi also holds for any ¼ 2 ¦.
Hence ga(x) =
Pn
i=1 aix(i) = min¼2¦ fa¼¢xg. Moreover, in terms of the extreme
points of the polyhedron generated by the permutations of a, ga(x) can be written









attained when ¼ = ¼x, that is, Wv(x) =
Pn
i=1 c¼x




Let ¼ be any permutation function in ¦ and let x 2 S be any feasible outcome.
If P(¼x;i) µ P(¼;i) holds for all i 2 N corresponding to non-zero components of vector







Otherwise, consider the smallest non-zero component of outcome x, which we denote






i (v)xi by xi1,






















xi1 ¡1. Notice that P(¼x;i1)[fi1g constitutes the whole set of agents that
obtain non-null outcomes with the allocation x.
It is easy to check that
P
i2P(¼x;i1)[fi1g c¼x







i (v) for all ¼ 2 ¦, and











If P(¼x;i) µ P(¼;i) for all i 2 P(¼x;i1), then the result follows from convexity.
Otherwise, by dividing the inequality by x0
i2 (the smallest non-null component of vector

















This procedure of reduction obviously ends in a ¯nite number of steps and this concludes
the proof. 2








² SPO, since m¤ is a increasing function.
² ACA: Consider x 2 F¤(S) \ T. y 2 F¤(T), y 6= x, implies m¤(y) = m¤(x) and
therefore y 2 F(S). Conversely, y 2 F¤(S) \ T, y 6= x, implies also m¤(y) =
m¤(x) and therefore y 2 F(T).
² Co-INV, since m¤ is linear in C¤(^ ¸), for each ^ ¸ 2 ext(¤).
² CON, since m¤ is piecewise linear.
² COM, since m¤ is concave and S is convex.
To prove the su±ciency part, consider the class of equivalence ­, for which Co-INV is
satis¯ed. We will show that there exists ¤ 2 ­ for which the solution F that satis¯es
SPO, ACA, Co-INV, CON and COM is F¤. To do that we consider, as in Ok and Zhou
(2000), a real function on IRn
+ de¯ned by:
m(x) = inf ft 2 IRjt1n 2 F(cchfx;t1ng)g:
The following lemmas state that m(x) is linear, increasing, homogeneous of degree one,
additive in each cone generated by any ¤ 2 ­ and concave function and it result to be
that F(S) = argmaxx2S m(x). These results and their proofs are adaptation of that
in Ok and Zhou (2000) and are included for completeness of the paper.
Lemma 6.1. Let t2 > t1 and x 2 IRn
+. If t11n 2 F(cchfx;t11ng), then F(cchfx;t21ng) =
ft21ng.
Proof. By applying Co-INV we obtain t21n 2 F(cchfx;t11ng + f(t2 ¡ t1)1ng) =
F(cchfx + (t2 ¡ t1)1n;t21ng). Since cchfx;t21ng ½ cchfx + (t2 ¡ t1)1n;t21ng and
PO(cchfx+(t2¡t1)1n;t21ng)\cchfx;t21ng = ft21ng, by applying SPO and ACA, we
have F(cchfx;t21ng) = ft21ng. 2
Lemma 6.2. m(x)1n 2 F(cchfx;m(x)1ng).
Proof. From the de¯nition of m(x) and Lemma 6.1, it follows that f(m(x)+1=l)1ng =
F(cchfx;(m(x) + 1=l)1ng) for all l ¸ 1.
Hence, by applying CON, m(x)1n 2 F(cchfx;m(x)1ng). 2
Lemma 6.3. Let t 2 IR+. If t < m(x), then F(cchfx;t1ng) = fxg.
Proof. First, notice that as a consequence of SPO, F(cchfx;t1ng) µ cofx;t1ng holds,
and since t < m(x), t1n = 2 F(cchfx;t1ng). Now let y = ¹x + (1 ¡ ¹)t1n for some
¹ 2 (0;1), and suppose on the contrary that y 2 F(cchfx;t1ng).
Suppose ¯rst that ¹ 2 (0;1=2] and y = ¹x + (1 ¡ ¹)t1n 2 F(cchfx;t1ng). By ACA
y 2 F(cchfx;yg) and by Co-INV, t1n 2 F(cchfx+(t1n¡y);t1ng). ACA can be applied
now because F(cchfx+(t1n ¡y);t1ng) µ cchfx;t1ng and y 2 cchfx+(t1n ¡y);t1ng\
F(cchfx;t1ng) to obtain t1n 2 F(cchfx + (t1n ¡ y);t1ng) = cchfx + (t1n ¡ y);t1ng \







Next suppose that ¹ 2 (1=2;1). De¯ne:
y0 = y
y1 = y0 + (y0 ¡ x) = y + (y ¡ x) = 2y ¡ x =
(2¹ ¡ 1)x + 2(1 ¡ ¹)t1n = ¹1x + (1 ¡ ¹1)t1n
y2 = y1 + (y1 ¡ x) = 2y1 ¡ x =
(4¹ ¡ 3)x + 4(1 ¡ ¹)t1n = ¹2x + (1 ¡ ¹2)t1n
. . .
yk = yk¡1 + (yk¡1 ¡ x) = 2yk¡1 ¡ x =
(2k¹ ¡ (2k ¡ 1))x + 2k(1 ¡ ¹)t1n = ¹kx + (1 ¡ ¹k)t1n
Again by ACA y 2 F(cchfx;yg). Hence, by recursively applying Co-INV, we obtain:
yk 2 F(cchfx;yk¡1g + (yk ¡ yk¡1)) = F(cchfyk¡1;ykg); for k = 1;2;::: (6.1)
We will prove by induction that yk 2 F(cchfx;t1ng) for every k = 1;2;:::. By
hypothesis y0 2 F(cchfx;t1ng) and assume that yk¡1 2 F(cchfx;t1ng). Hence,
cchfyk¡1;ykg \ F(cchfx;t1ng) 6= ; and yk 2 F(cchfyk¡1;ykg) by (6.1). Hence, by
ACA, it follows that yk 2 F(cchfx;t1ng).
Now notice that there exists ¹ k 2 IN such that ¹k 2 (0;1=2]. We have y
¹ k 2 F(cchfx;t1ng),
and we can apply the ¯rst part of the proof to conclude that t1n 2 F(cchfx;t1ng). This
again contradicts t < m(x). 2
Lemma 6.4. fx;m(x)1ng µ F(cchfx;m(x)1ng).
Proof. It follows from Lemma 6.2 that m(x)1n 2 F(cchfx;m(x)1ng) and from Lemma
6.3 that F(cchfx;(m(x) ¡ 1=l)1ng) = fxg for all l ¸ 1. Therefore, by applying CON
x 2 F(cchfx;m(x)1ng). 2
Lemma 6.5. F(cchfx;m(x)1ng) = cofx;m(x)1ng.
Proof. Take y = ¹x + (1 ¡ ¹)m(x)1n and ¹ 2 (0;1).
First, suppose that ¹ 2 [1=2;1) and let z = (1 ¡ ¹)x+ ¹m(x)1n. Since x 2 cchfx;zg\
F(cchfx;m(x)1ng), by ACA, x 2 F(cchfx;zg), and thus by Co-INV,
y = x + (y ¡ x) 2 F(cchfx + (y ¡ x);z + (y ¡ x)g) = F(cchfy;m(x)1ng): (6.2)
Notice also that m(x)1n 2 F(cchfx;m(x)1ng) \ cchfy;m(x)1ng. Hence, by ACA,
F(cchfy;m(x)1ng) = F(cchfx;m(x)1ng) \ cchfy;m(x)1ng. Now, by using (6.2), we
obtain y 2 F(cchfx;m(x)1ng).
For the case ¹ 2 (0;1=2) an analogous reasoning can be used. Let z = (1 ¡ ¹)x +
¹m(x)1n. Since m(x)1n 2 cchfz;m(x)1ng \ F(cchfx;m(x)1ng), by ACA, m(x)1n 2
F(cchfz;m(x)1ng), and thus by Co-INV,
y = m(x)1n + (y ¡ m(x)1n) 2








Notice now that x 2 F(cchfx;m(x)1ng) \ cchfx;yg.
Hence F(cchfx;yg) = F(cchfx;m(x)1ng) \ cchfx;yg, by ACA, and it follows from
(6.3) that y 2 F(cchfx;m(x)1ng). 2





ft1ng; if t > m(x)
cofx;m(x)1ng; if t = m(x)
fxg if t < m(x)
(6.4)
Lemma 6.6. If x 2 F(cchfx;yg), then m(x) ¸ m(y).
Proof. Suppose that m(x) < m(y), and take t such that m(x) < t < m(y). Consider
z 2 F(cchfx;y;t1ng). By SPO, there exists w 2 cofx;yg such that z 2 cofw;t1ng. It
follows from (6.4) that , either w 2 F(cchfw;t1ng) or t1n 2 F(cchfw;t1ng) (or both).
Assume ¯rst that w 2 F(cchfw;t1ng). In this case z 2 F(cchfx;y;t1ng)\cchfw;t1ng,
and it follows from ACA that w 2 F(cchfx;y;t1ng). Hence, w 2 F(cchfx;y;t1ng) \
cchfx;yg, and by ACA F(cchfx;yg) = F(cchfx;y;t1ng) \ cchfx;yg. Therefore, x 2
F(cchfx;y;t1ng). Now x 2 F(cchfx;y;t1ng) \ cchfx;t1ng. By applying ACA again
x 2 F(cchfx;t1ng), but by (6.4), this contradicts t > m(x). Now assume t1n 2
F(cchfw;t1ng). Then F(cchfx;y;t1ng)\cchfw;t1ng = F(cchfw;t1ng), by ACA, since
z 2 F(cchfx;y;t1ng) \ cchfw;t1ng. This implies that t1n 2 F(cchfx;y;t1ng). Now
t1n 2 F(cchfx;y;t1ng) \ cchfy;t1ng. Hence, by applying ACA again, we obtain t1n 2
F(cchfy;t1ng). This contradicts t < m(y). 2
Lemma 6.7. If x 2 F(cchfx;yg) and m(x) · m(y), then y 2 F(cchfx;yg).
Proof. Take z 2 F(cchfx;y;m(x)1ng). By SPO, there exists w 2 cofx;yg such that
z 2 cofw;m(x)1ng. First we shall prove that m(y)1n 2 F(cchfx;y;m(x)1ng).
Either w 2 F(cchfw;m(y)1ng), or m(y)1n 2 F(cchfw;m(y)1ng) is followed from (6.4).
In addition, z 2 F(cchfx;y;t1ng) \ cchfw;m(y)1ng, hence it follows from ACA that
either w 2 F(cchfx;y;m(y)1ng) or m(y)1n 2 F(cchfx;y;m(y)1ng).
Let us see that w 2 F(cchfx;y;m(y)1ng) implies m(y)1n 2 F(cchfx;y;m(y)1ng).
Notice that w 2 F(cchfx;y;m(y)1ng) \ cchfx;yg, and from ACA it follows that
F(cchfx;y;m(y)1ng) \ cchfx;yg = F(cchfx;yg). Thus x 2 F(cchfx;y;m(y)1ng). We
can apply again ACA and F(cchfx;y;m(y)1ng)\cchfx;m(y)1ng = F(cchfx;m(y)1ng).
Hence, m(y)1n 2 F(cchfx;y;m(y)1ng) because m(y)1n 2 F(cchfx;m(y)1ng), as a con-
sequence of m(x) · m(y) and (6.4).
Now we are going to show that y 2 F(cchfx;yg).
Since m(y)1n 2 F(cchfx;y;m(x)1ng) \ cchfy;m(y)1ng, it follows from ACA that
cofy;m(y)1ng = F(cchfy;m(y)1ng) = F(cchfx;y;m(y)1ng) \ cchfy;m(y)1ng, and
therefore y 2 F(cchfx;y;m(y)1ng).
Besides, since y 2 F(cchfx;y;m(y)1ng) \ cchfx;yg, by ACA F(cchfx;y;m(y)1ng) \
cchfx;yg = F(cchfx;yg). Therefore, y 2 F(cchfx;yg). 2







Proof. If x ¸ y, it follows from SPO that x 2 F(cchfx;yg), and hence, by Lemma 6.6,
m(x) ¸ m(y) holds. Moreover, if x > y, let us see that m(x) > m(y). If m(x) ·
m(y), then by (6.4) m(y)1n 2 F(cchfx;m(y)1ng) holds. Since cchfy;m(y)1ng ½
cchfx;m(y)1ng and F(cchfx;m(y)1ng)\cchfy;m(y)1ng 6= ; (m(y)1n 2 F(cchfx;m(y)1ng)),
it follows from ACA that
F(cchfx;m(y)1ng) \ cchfy;m(y)1ng = F(cchfy;m(y)1ng): (6.5)
As a consequence of (6.4), we have that y 2 F(cchfy;m(y)1ng), and this together with
(6.5) implies y 2 F(cchfx;m(y)1ng). This contradicts SPO. 2
Lemma 6.9. a) m is ­-coregionally additive, that is, if x;y 2 IRn
+ are ¤-coregional
then m(x + y) = m(x) + m(y).
b) m is homogeneous of degree one.
Proof. Let us ¯rst prove ¤-coregional additivity. Let x;y 2 IRn
+ be ¤-coregional, and
" > 0. Since F(cchfx;(m(x)+")1ng) = f(m(x)+")1ng, and PO(cchfx;(m(x)+")1ng)
and PO(cchfx;(m(x) + ")1ng + y) are ¤-coregional, by Co-INV we have:
F(cchfx + y;(m(x) + ")1n + yg) = (m(x) + ")1n + y;
Analogously, since F(cchfy;m(y) + ")1ng) = f(m(y) + ")1ng, and PO(cchfy;m(y) +
")1ng) and PO(cchfy;m(y) + ")1ng + (m(x) + ")1n) are ¤-coregional, by Co-INV,
F(cchf(m(x)+")1n +y;(m(x)+")1n +(m(y)+")1ng) = (m(x)+")1n +(m(y)+")1n;
Hence by Lemma 6.6, we obtain:
m(x) + m(y) + 2" ¸ m((m(x) + ")1n + y) ¸ m(x + y):
By letting " # 0, we obtain m(x) + m(y) ¸ m(x + y).
Reciprocally, since F(cchfx;m(x) ¡ ")1ng) = fxg, and PO(cchfx;m(x) + ")1ng) and
PO(cchfx;m(x) + ")1ng + y) are ¤-coregional, as a consequence of Co-INV,
F(cchfx + y;(m(x) ¡ ")1n + yg) = x + y
Analogously, since F(cchfy;m(y) ¡ ")1ng) = fyg, and PO(cchfy;m(y) ¡ ")1ng) and
PO(cchfy;m(y) ¡ ")1ng + (m(x) ¡ ")1n) are ¤-coregional, by Co-INV,
F(cchf(m(x) ¡ ")1n + (m(y) ¡ ")1n;(m(x) ¡ ")1n + yg) = (m(x) ¡ ")1n + y;
Hence, it follows from Lemma 6.6 that:
m(x + y) ¸ m((m(x) ¡ ")1n + y) ¸ m(x) + m(y) ¡ 2":







Now let us prove that m is linear homogenous. Co-regional additivity implies that





for all k 2 IN and therefore,
m(¹x) = ¹m(x) for all ¹ 2 l Q++. Then, by choosing rational sequences falg; fblg 2 l Q++
such that al " ¹ and bl # ¹, as l ! 1, as a consequence of the monotonicity of m we
obtain that alm(x) = m(alx) · m(¹x) · m(blx) = blm(x) for all l > 1. And by letting
l ! 1, we ¯nd m(¹x) = ¹m(x). 2
Lemma 6.10. F(S) = argmax
x2S
m(x).
Proof. Let x 2 F(S) and y 2 S. Since S is convex, it follows from ACA that x 2
F(cchfx;yg). Therefore, m(x) ¸ m(y) as a consequence of 6.6.
Reciprocally consider x 2 argmaxx2S m(x) and by contradiction suppose x = 2 F(S).
Take y 2 F(S). Since x 2 argmaxx2S m(x), m(x) ¸ m(y). Since S is convex, y 2
F(cchfx;yg) by ACA. Therefore, by Lemma 6.6, m(y) ¸ m(x) and m(y) = m(x).
Hence, by Lemma 6.7, x 2 F(cchfx;yg). Now, since cchfx;yg µ S and F(S) \
cchfx;yg 6= ; (y 2 F(S)), it follows from ACA that F(S) \ cchfx;yg = F(cchfx;yg).
Therefore x 2 F(S) and this contradicts the assumption. 2
Lemma 6.11. m is concave.
Proof. In Lemma 3 in Ok and Zhou (1999), they show that if a choice correspon-
dence, F, de¯ned by F(S) = argmax
x2S
m(x) for all S 2 § (where m is continuous and
strictly increasing), veri¯es COM, then m(x) must be quasi-concave on IRn
+. As a con-
sequence of Lemma 6.9, m is also linear homogeneous. Hence m is concave because any
quasi-concave, linearly homogeneous, and non-negative-valued function on IRn
+ must
be concave. 2
In what follows we show that for all x 2 IRn
+, m(x) = m¤(x) for some ¤ µ ¢n.
Consider the family of cones fCjgj=1;2;:::;k, in the orthant IRn
+ associated to ­. Since
m is a piecewise linear increasing function, as stated in Lemmas 6.7 and 6.9, for each
x 2 Cj, m(x) = ¸j ¢x for some ¸j 2 IRn
++. We are going to prove that m(x) =
minf¸j¢x; j = 1;2;:::;kg. Suppose that there exists i;j 2 f1;2;:::;kg and x 2 Ci
such that ¸i¢x > ¸j¢x. Since int(Cj) 6= ;, consider y 2 int(Cj) and z 2 cofx;yg such
that z = ¯x + (1 ¡ ¯)y 2 int(Cj). Now, it follows from the concavity of m that:
¸j¢z = m(z) ¸ ¯m(x) + (1 ¡ ¯)m(y) = ¯¸i¢x + (1 ¡ ¯)¸j¢y >
> ¯¸j¢x + (1 ¡ ¯)¸j¢y = ¸j¢(¯x + (1 ¡ ¯)y) = ¸j¢z
and this is a contradiction.
Since m(1n) = minft 2 IRjt1n 2 F(cchf1n;t1ng)g = 1, then ¸j ¢1n = 1, for all
j = 1;2;:::;k and ¸j 2 int(¢n).
Consider now the polyhedron ¤ µ ¢n generated by f¸j; j = 1;2;:::;kg. All these
generators are extreme points of ¤. Suppose, on the contrary, that ¸l, l 2 f1;2;:::;kg
















j6=l ¯j¸j¢x = ¸l¢x, which is a contradiction.
2
Proof of Theorem 4.2 : Since, for two-person bargaining problems, as a consequence
of Lemma 6.8 and of Lemma 6.9, m is an increasing linear function on C1 = fx 2
IR2
+ jx1 ¡ x2 ¸ 0g and C2 = fx 2 IR2
+ jx1 ¡ x2 · 0g, m is either concave or convex.
Therefore, we only need to show that for all x 2 IRn
+, m(x) = M¤(x) for some ¤ µ ¢n
if m is convex. Consider the family of cones fCjgj=1;2;:::;k, in the orthant IRn
+ associated
to ­l. Since m is a piecewise linear increasing function, as stated in Lemmas 6.7 and
6.9, for each x 2 Cj, m(x) = ¸j¢x for some ¸j 2 IRn
++. We are going to prove that
m(x) = maxf¸j¢x; j = 1;2;:::;kg. Suppose that there exists i;j 2 f1;2;:::;kg and
x 2 Ci such that ¸i¢x < ¸j¢x. Since int(Cj) 6= ;, consider y 2 int(Cj) and z 2 cofx;yg
such that z = ¯x + (1 ¡ ¯)y 2 int(Cj). Since m is convex it follows:
¸j¢z = m(z) · ¯m(x) + (1 ¡ ¯)m(y) = ¯¸i¢x + (1 ¡ ¯)¸j¢y <
< ¯¸j¢x + (1 ¡ ¯)¸j¢y = ¸j¢(¯x + (1 ¡ ¯)y) = ¸j¢z
and this is a contradiction.
Since m(1n) = minft 2 IRjt1n 2 F(cchf1n;t1ng)g = 1, then ¸j ¢1n = 1, for all
j = 1;2;:::;k and ¸j 2 int(¢n).
Consider now the polyhedron ¤ µ ¢n generated by f¸j; j = 1;2;:::;kg. All these
generators are extreme points of ¤. Suppose, on the contrary, that ¸l, l 2 f1;2;:::;kg










j6=l ¯j¸j¢x = ¸l¢x, and this is a contradiction. 2
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